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I
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
1.

JURISDICTION.

This Court has jurisdiction over

this action by virtue of 78-2a-3(2)(d), which grants this Court
appellant jurisdiction over appeals from the circuit courts..
2.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS.

This appeal is based upon

a JUDGMENT entered by the Third Circuit Court of Salt Lake
County, Salt Lake Department, on October 11, 1989, the Honorable
Robin Reese presiding.
contract

dispute

The controversy below arose out of a

relative

to

the

shipping

by Appellant

of

drilling mud to Florida on Respondent's trucks.

Appellant had

contacted

a price, and

an agent of Respondent

to negotiate

understood from the negotiations that a certain number of trucks
at a certain price would be needed.

When Appellant was later

billed for additional charges, Appellant refused to pay, which
resulted in the filing of the civil action.
Later on, as the parties attempted to work out their
differences, Appellant's president sent Respondent a $3,400 check
with an attached letter indicating that the payment Mwill satisfy
all claims against [Appellant] by [Respondent] and
will

dismiss

all pending

legal action . . . .!l

[Respondent]
Respondent

accepted and deposited the check in its bank account, but did not
sign the attached memorandum.

1

The trial court found that the matter was controlled by
49 U.S. Code §10761 [Interstate Commerce Act]. Citing this and
other cases, the trial court found that even if Respondent had
misquoted a lower tariff rate, Appellant was bound to pay the
legal tariff rate, which in this case was higher.

The court

further stated that the defense of accord and satisfaction was
not available to Appellant.
Further, the trial court refused to dismiss the case
after trial on the basis that no enforceable contract had been
proved as well as Appellant's motion below that the matter should
have been referred to and decided by the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
II
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the court committed reversible error in

failing to find that there lacked a meeting of the minds at the
time these parties attempted to negotiate their contract, such
that no enforceable agreement between the parties was ever
consummated.
2.

Whether

the trial court,

in its decision of

October 11, 1989, committed reversible error by considering
itself bound by the legal principles of the case of Caravan

2
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3.

Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
4.

70A-3-202(2), Utah Code:

An indorsement must be written by or on behalf
of the holder and on the instrument or on a
paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a
part thereof.
70A-3-206(3), Utah Code:
. . . any transferee under an indorsement
which is conditional . . . must pay or apply
any value given by him for or on the security
of the instrument consistently with the
indorsement . . . .
IV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings Below

and Disposition.

A.

The Complaint below was filed on July 10,

1987, wherein it was alleged that Appellant was obligated to
Respondent

in the sum of $6,987.

Respondent answered the

Complaint on July 17, 1987, alleging failure to state a claim
upon which

relief may be granted;

estoppel; failure of

consideration; statute of frauds; and impossibility of recovery
because of Respondent's own fraud.
B.

The parties engaged in discovery efforts through

Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, after
which Respondent amended its Complaint to allege a credit in
4
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f^ape

trailers,'1

(Transcript,

P.

33,

L.

trucks would that rate.
D.

18) and then stating that each of

two

(Transcript, P. 33, LL. 19-22)

Respondent's

manager

testified

that

this

information was conveyed to Appellant and that it was agreed

to.

(Transcript, P. 33, L. 19 - P. 34, L. 10)
B.

Appellant's

five single trailers,
necessary,
trailer.

given

mud was sent to Florida

on

which Respondent's manager testified

were

the load limitations and requirements on

each

(Transcript, P. 52, L. 19 - P. 53, L. 1)
F.

letter

drilling

to

On

May

15,

1986,

Respondent's manager

sent

Appellant (trial Exhibit 12) confirming the price

a
of

$4,658 total for two full sets of double trailers and stating:
[t]hese two invoices are for the original four
trailer loads that we expected to haul for
Nova Mud Corp. This was the agreed to cost of
$2 per vehicle mile.
G.

Mr.

[emphasis added]

Perry, Respondent's manager, testified at the

time of trial that the letter of May 15,
issued.

to

computation
M

In

my

was

incorrectly

(Transcript, P. 56, LL. 20-24 and P. 57, LL. 3-9)
H.

relative

1986,

Mr.
the

Perry
meaning

seemed confused at the time
of ''vehicle" as it

of charges under the tariff.
industry

(Transcript,

a

vehicle

means

applies

of

trial
to

He first stated
one

single

the
that

trailer."

P. 51, L. 16) When questioned further, however, and

6

in reference to Exhibit 4, Item 162, he admitted that the word
"vehicle" can and does refer to a tractor and rw£ trailers.
(Transcript P. 72, LL. 16-24)
I.

Perry further admitted, (Transcript, P. 86-87)

that had the equipment been available, i.e., trailers of fortyfive feet in length, that the merchandise shipped by Respondent
could have been transported on two trailers instead of four.
J.

Appellant's president had hired freight companies

on an ongoing basis in the past, and was used to getting fortyfive foot trailers (Transcript, P. 110, L. 15) and paying freight
rates

at

approximately

$1

per

mile.

(Transcript, P. 112, L.

8-12)
K.

Appellant's president's understanding was that the

agreement was for $1 per mile for one truck unit. (Transcript, P.
114, L. 19 - P. 115, L. 5)
L.

Newman's understanding of "one truck unit" was a

unit with as many trailers as could be hauled legally behind a
truck.
M.

Appellant

would

not

have hired

Respondent

if

Appellant had understood $2 per mile per trailer or per truck
unit would be the charges.
N.

(Transcript, P. 116, LL. 7-14)

Appellant moved in a timely manner to send this

matter to the Interstate Commerce Commission for determination

7

and to dismiss because of the failure of Respondent to prove an
enforceable contract at the time of trial.
0.

(R, 123)

After the material was shipped to the state of

Florida, a dispute developed regarding the amount actually due
Respondent

On July 31, 1987, Appellant ? s

for its services.

president sent to Respondent a check in the amount of $3,400,
attached to which was a memorandum of understanding signed by
Appellant that the $3,400 was being made in full payment of any
amounts claimed and that Respondent would dismiss all pending
legal action arising from invoices which are the subject matter
of this action.
P.
same,

but

Respondent received the check and negotiated the
did

accompanying it.

not

sign

the memorandum

of

understanding

(Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 1, respectively)
V
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

POINT 1.

There was no "meeting of the minds11 at the

time this alleged agreement was negotiated,
Respondent from enforcing it.
relative

to the number

thereby precluding

There was unresolved confusion

of trailers

and

the

allocation

application of the tariff rate to the number of trailers.
these

points

were

critical

to the

enforceable contract.

8

agreement,

there

and
Since

is no

POINT 2.
the

time

of

A.

trial

The evidence propounded by Respondent at
is legally insufficient

correct

tariff applicable to

without

that information,

these

to

establish

proceedings.

the

Accordingly,

it is objectively impossible for

the

court to legally determine any amounts due and owing.
POINT
proscribing
case.

In

2.

B.

The

provisions

of

49

U.S.C.

negotiation of a tariff are not applicable
this case,

§10761
to

this

the dispute was not on the amount of

the

tariff, but was on the number of trucks and trailers necessary to
convey the cargo.
asserting

the

Accordingly, Appellant is not foreclosed from

position

that

Respondent

was

bound

by

the

restrictive indorsement on the $3,400 check of July 31, 1987.
POINT

3.

In

view

of

the

foregoing

arguments,

Respondent was bound by the restrictive indorsement on the $3,400
check of July 31,

1987,

and for that reason is foreclosed

asserting any undercharges.
§10761,

given

trailers

and

from

This is not proscribed by 49 U.S.C.

the fact that the dispute was over the number
the

application

of the rate

to

the

number

of
of

trailers, and not a dipute over the rate to be applied.
POINT
primary

4.

The

Interstate

Commerce

Commission

jurisdiction over determining issues of this

kind.

this court does not have the power to allow Appellant to
its defenses supposedly proscribed by 49 U.S.C.
9

§10761,

has
If

assert
but the

ICC is, than to avoid trampling on Appellant's constitutional
rights to equal protection and due process of law, the court must
refer the matter to the Interstate Commerce Commission for
determination,
VI
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THB COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY CONCLUDING
THAT THERE WAS AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
Although

the

court,

in

its

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law (R., 182-185) does not specifically make a
finding that there was an enforceable

contract between

the

parties, the fact the court granted judgment as prayed against
Defendant necessarily presupposes that there was such a contract.
Appellant believes

that this conclusion constitutes

reversible

error on the part of the court, and that the record clearly shows
that there was no meeting of the mind between the parties, and
hence no enforceable contract.
A number of Utah cases are illustrative on the issue.
In the case of John Call Engineering v. Manti City Corp., Utah,
743 P.2d 1205 (1987), the court set forth the general proposition
relating to contract formation.

10

Citing the earlier Utah case of

Oberhansly v^ Earle, Utah, 572 P.2d 1384 (1977) with approval,
the court stated at 1207 that
. . . it is a basic principle of contract law
that there can be no contract without the
mutual assent of the parties.
[citations
omitted] In this regard, the intentions of
the parties to a contract are controlling, and
generally those intentions will be found in
the instrument itself. However, if a writing
is not sufficient to establish meaning, resort
may be had to extraneous evidence manifesting
the intention of the parties. [citations
omitted]
Another 1987 case, Mooney v. GR & Associates, Utah
App., 746 P.2d 1174 (1987) provides further direction on this
point.

At 1178, the court made the following observations:
It is well settled that a contract is voidable
if there is a mutual mistake of material fact,
[citing] Kiahtipes v^ Mill, Utah, 649 P.2d 9,
13 (1982); Langston v. McQuarrie, Utah App.,
741 P.2d 554, 557 (19877 and Renner v. Kehl,
Arizona,
722 P.2d 262, 264-65 T 1 9 T 5 7 .
However, there can be no mutual mistake as to
an event which is occur in the future. The
Colorado Supreme Court recognized this rule
when it stated that:
A party may rescind a contract when, at
the time a contract is made, the parties
make a mutual mistake about a material
fact, the existence of which is basic
assumption of the contract.
If the
parties
harbor
only
mistake
and
expectations as to the course of future
events and there assumptions as to facts
existing at the time of the contract are
correct, recission [sic] is not proper.
This rule is justified by the reality that
parties to commercial contract rarely
predict future events with total accuracy.

11

Indeed,
a contract often
functions
p r i m a r i l y t o i n s u l a t e t h e p a r t i e s from
u n c e r t a i n t y and t o a l l o c a t e t h e r i s k of
future events.
[ c i t i n g ] B e a l s v. T r i - B
A s s o c , C o l o r a d o App., 64"? P. 2 d~~7 8 , 8 0
(1082)
In t h i s c a s e ,
parties

it

seems c l e a r from the record t h a t

n e v e r had a " m e e t i n g of t h e minds 11 from

t h e r e b y not only j u s t i f y i n g ,

the

but a l s o mandating t h e

the

outset,

rescission

of t h e a t t e m p t e d agreement between the p a r t i e s .
The c o u r t

itself

has

recognized

that

t h e r e was no

meeting of the minds in i t s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

(R, 182-185)
In t h i s r e g a r d , the c o u r t s t a t e d (R, 182) as f o l l o w s :
The c o u r t f i n d s
established:

the following

t o have

been

In March of 1986, Charles Perry, employee of
the p l a i n t i f f company, was c o n t a c t e d by Larry
Newman of t h e d e f e n d a n t .
Newman i n d i c a t e d
t h a t he w a n t e d t o s h i p 9 0 , 0 0 0 p o u n d s of
d r i l l i n g mud t o Cape C a n a v e r a l , F l o r i d a and
asked what i t would c o s t t o s h i p t h e same.
P e r r y q u o t e d a r a t e of $2 p e r m i l e p e r
t r u c k l o a d a n t i c i p a t i n g t h a t two t r u c k l o a d s
( t r a c t o r s ) would be needed to haul t h e c a r g o .
Newman somehow u n d e r s t o o d t h a t o n l y one
trucTTToa!T~was n e c e s s a r y t o h a u l t h e 90,(100
pound ca7go and t h a t t h e T h a r g e was $"1 p e r
m i l e , [emphasis added]
The t e s t i m o n y at t r i a l

further

confirms t h e f a c t

that

t h e r e never was a meeting of the minds between the two p a r t i e s .
P e r r y , the t e r m i n a l manager of Respondent, t e s t i f i e d as f o l l o w s :

12

1.
Newman,

That

he h a d a t e l e p h o n e

a principal

telephone

to

of A p p e l l a n t ,

obtain

rates

on t h e

who c o n t a c t e d

carriage

W e s t J o r d a n , U t a h t o Cape C a n a v e r a l ,
23,

conversation

of

Mr. P e r r y

drilling

Florida.

mud

by

from

(Transcript,

P.

LL. 15 t h r o u g h P. 3 1 , L. 2)
2.

division

Perry

manager

12-14)

Perry's

2,329 m i l e s

then

P. 3 2 ,

that
L.

t e s t i m o n y was t h a t

n

Florida)

[f]or

rate

b e t w e e n West
two

Jordan,

truckloads,

i n f o r m a t i o n t o A p p e l l a n t and t h a t

P. 3 3 , L. 19 t h r o u g h P. 34,

3.

Mr.
is

of

(Transcript,

ff

.

Perry
.

.

doubles
P. 27,

either

which are
L.

mud was s e n t on f i v e
necessary,

each t r a i l e r .

given

In t h i s

single

trailers,

(Transcript,

Despite
alleged agreement

Mr.

load

that

he

i t was a g r e e d

to.

or f o r t y - f i v e

case,

trial,

that
foot

foot

of

long.11

[sic]

drilling

Perry

testified

and r e q u i r e m e n t s
P. 5 3 ,

the

L.

terms

Mr. P e r r y ,

a

trailer

Appellant's

which Mr.

sureness
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Cape

trailers."

testified

limitations

a t t h e t i m e of

for

L. 10)

P. 52, L. 19 t h r o u g h

Perry's

that

U t a h and

testified

twenty-seven

5-6)

the

then

further
a forty

quoted

four

conveyed t h a t

or a s e t

Perry

his

was $2 p e r m i l e

P. 3 3 ,

"truckload"

14-18)

contacted

( T r a n s c r i p t P. 3 3 , LL.

(Transcript,

(Transcript

LL.

the

he

2) and t h e n

which was $2 p e r m i l e .

(The d i s t a n c e

Canaveral,

testified

(Transcript,

rate to Appellant,

were

w i t h L. A.

on

1)
of

the

on May 1 5 ,

1986, had sent a letter to Appellant confirming the total price
of $4,658 which can either mean $1 per mile for each double
trailer or $2 per mile for all vehicles collectively.

The

letter, which was offered and received as Exhibit 12 at the time
of trial ''confirms" the confusion.

The letter reflects a total

of $4,658 for two numbered invoices and states in pertinent part
that
[tjhese two invoices are for the original four
trailer loads that we expected to haul for
Nova Mud Corp.
This was the agreed to cost
of $2 per vehicle mile, [emphasis added]
During the trial, Mr. Perry testified that the letter
of May 15, 1986, confirming the erroneous amounts, as well as the
original invoices, were incorrectly issued.

(Transcript, P. 56,

LL. 22-24 and P. 57, LL. 3-9)
To compound the confusion, Mr. Perry testified at the
time of trial that the published tariff in effect at the time the
service was performed for Appellant was for 200$ per mile per
vehicle

used.

(Transcript P. 63, LL. 22-24)

Since it was

obvious that there was significant confusion between both parties
as to the meaning of "vehicle'1 for purposes of their agreement,
Mr. Perry was questioned regarding the meaning of the word
"vehicle."

(Transcript, P. 71, LL. 1-16)

Mr. Perry at first

stated unequivocably that "In my industry a vehicle means one
single trailer."

(Transcript, P. 71, L. 16)
14

However, when

questioned

further

and

with

reference

to

Exhibit

4 (and

p a r t i c u l a r l y r e f e r r i n g to the f o u r t h page of Exhibit 4, Item 162,
wherein i t

i s s t a t e d ". . . in a v e h i c l e c o n s i s t i n g of not more

t h a n two t r a i l e r s

. . . . " ) , Mr. P e r r y r e c a n t e d

his

previous

t e s t i m o n y and admitted t h a t the word " v e h i c l e " can and does r e f e r
t o a t r a c t o r and two t r a i l e r s .

( T r a n s c r i p t , p. 72, 1 1 . 16-24)

Perry a l s o admitted ( T r a n s c r i p t ,

p. 86-87) t h a t had the equipment

been a v a i l a b l e ,

i.e.,

t r a i l e r s of f o r t y - f i v e

feet

in l e n g t h ,

that

the merchandise shipped by Appellant could have been t r a n s p o r t e d
on two t r a i l e r s i n s t e a d of four!
L a r r y A. Newman, A p p e l l a n t ! s P r e s i d e n t , t e s t i f i e d
follows

regarding

the

"agreement"

between

Appellant

as
and

Respondent:
1.
negotiate

L a r r y A. Newman c o n t a c t e d Respondent

a freight
2.

Appellant

on an ongoing b a s i s ,
trailers.

r a t e to Florida."

(Transcript

. .

P.

110, L. 9)

in the past had h i r e d f r e i g h t

companies

and was used to using f u l l

forty-five

foot

( T r a n s c r i p t , P. 110, L. 15)
3.

A p p e l l a n t u s u a l l y was a b l e t o g e t f r e i g h t

per loaded mile from 83<t to $1.10 per m i l e .
LL.

t o ".

(Transcript,

rates
P.

Ill,

7-12)
4.

During

Larry

A.

Newman's

first

conversation

[ o s t e n s i b l y with Mr. P e r r y ] , he t o l d Respondent t h a t he was in
15

the habit of paying around $1 per mile and "Could he do it for
that?11

(Transcript, P. 112, L. 8-12)
5.

Mr. Newman's understanding was that the agreement

was for $1 per mile for one truck unit.

(Transcript, P. 114,

L. 19 - P. 115, L. 5)
6.
many

Furthermore,

trailers

fl

one truck unit" was a unit with as

as could be hauled

legally behind

a truck.

(Transcript , P. 116, LL. 4-6)
7.

Appellant would not have hired Respondent if Larry

A. Newman had understood $2 per mile would be the charges.
(Transcript, P. 116, LL. 7-14)
It is clear from the foregoing discussion and the
authorities that there was in fact no "meeting of the minds." It
is further clear that there was a mistake of fact as to more than
one ". . . basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based
their bargain."

Langston v. McQuarrie, Utah App., 741 P.2d 554,

557 (1987) [citing] Bailey v. Ewing, Idaho App., 671 P.2d 1099
(1983).

In this case, the basic assumptions and facts vital to

the contract were (1) the price per trailer; and/or
number of trailers required.

(2) the

Either of these is individually

sufficient to rescind the agreement, if misunderstood.

Also, it

would be unusual for a mileage rate to be agreed on, or imposed
by statute, without an agreement as to the number of vehicles
16

necessary for the transport.

It is clear, as evidenced by the

May 15, 1986 letter of Perry to Appellant, that even Perry had
made a mistake in the terms of the agreement, which he later
tried to explain away.

Furthermore,

it is clear from the

testimony of Larry A. Newman, which stands unrefuted on the
record, that his understanding was something else. Clearly, from
the outset, there was no meeting of the minds and, under the
authorities cited herein, no enforceable agreement.
In anticipation that Respondent may argue there was no
motion before the court to dismiss under the theory of lack of an
enforceable contract, the undersigned asserts that in fact, the
motion was made during closing arguments. Because the transcript
of the closing arguments was for some reason not reproduced, that
is unavailable for perusal.

However, the court's notes (R., 234)

clearly show that at the "defense closing" the issue of "no K
[contract], because of no meeting of the minds" was raised.
POINT 2
UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE,
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS
RELIANCE ON 49 U.S.C. §10761 AND THE CASES
CITED IN THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

Respondent failed at the time of trial to prove

the tariff rate or its applicability to the alleged agreement
between the parties.
17

The court found that as a matter of law the parties to
this action cannot legally deviate from published rate.
185)

(R, 184-

However, in this case, even if it is assumed that the

parties did not have the legal capability of modifying the rate
to be charged, or even compromising the claim not in accordance
with the published rate schedules, there is still reversible
error.
In this case, the lack of an initial agreement is of
paramount importance, since the amount actually charged would be
contingent upon the number of vehicles actually pulled behind a
given trailer.
gross amount

Thus, the rate would remain the same, while the
charged

for the entire job could

depending on the number of 'Vehicles'1 used.

well vary,

Mr. Perry, on direct

examination, was questioned by his own attorney regarding the
charges (Transcript, P. 28, L. 8-18), which testimony follows:
Q. [by Ms. Van Frank] That gives you how many
trailers?
A. [by Mr. Perry]
quote.

Four, on the original

Q. What does the 4658 to at the bottom?
A. After communicating with my supervisor on
what the rate we could handle this would be,
it was $2 a mile times 2,329, $4,658.
Q.

For how many trailers?

18

A.
P e r tr uckload.
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'-(3 i s o u

B#

The

authorities relied upon by the court are

not

applicable to the facts of this case.
The
§10761

court obviously gave great deference to 49

and

the

cases cited in his

Caravan Refrigerated Cargo v.
388 (1989);
(1915);

Conclusions

Law,

Supreme Beef Processors,

Louisville and Nashville RY v^

and

Df

Consolidated Rail Corp.

v.

U.S.C.
i.e.

864 F.2d

MaxwelL, 237 U.S. 94

Standard Milling,

508

F.Supp. 277 (1981).
A close scrutiny of these cases,
they

are not applicable to the facts of the

each

of

the

misquotation
undercharges.

cases,
could
In

however, reveals that
instant

the issue before the court was

constitute

a

defense

to

an

case.
whether
action

the Supreme Beef Processors case at 392,

In
a
for
the

court held as follows:
A shipper that pleads unreasonableness as a
defense cannot prevent enforcement of the
filed tariff doctrine or force the district
court to stay proceedings and refer the case
to the commission. [citations omitted]
In the Consolidated Rail Corp. case the court was faced
with a question relating to demurrage charges,
that

case were set by tariffs under 49

U.S.C.

which charges
§10741(a).

court, at 279 stated that
[u]nder 49 U.S.C. §10761(a), a carrier may not
charge or receive a rate different than the
rate prescribed in the applicable tariff.
20

in
The

However, of vital importance to this case before the
court as well as the Consolidated Rail Corp. case, is the latter
court's statement at 280, as follows:
Standard [the defendant] may, of course, plead
and attempt to prove its defense that the
demurrage charges sought by ConRail were
caused by ConRailfs own fault.
Thus, it is clear that the Consolidated court relies
upon the pre-established fact that there was no legitimate
dispute about the terms of the agreement as it relates to a
tariff.

As long as there was no attempt to negotiate a tariff

different from that established

by statute,

there was no

proscription against a defense equitable or otherwise.

Such is

the case here. Nova Mud is not attempting to state at this point
that it has the right to renegotiate the rate or enter into an
enforceable accord and satisfaction relating to a dispute over
the rate. The rate is what it is as reflected in the applicable
tariff.

While Appellant does not concede that the rate

applicable in this case has been adequately proved by Respondent,
and in fact disputes that it has, it does agree that the rate
cannot be a subject of negotiation.

However, in this case as in

the Consolidated case, Nova Mud has the right to assert and have
considered other defenses which do not constitute an attempt to
renegotiate the actual rate.

As set forth above, Nova Mud

21

alleges that (1) Respondent did not prove what the actual rate
was;

(2) that whatever the rate was, it was unjustifiably

doubled, or even tripled, by Respondent in violation of the terms
of the agreement, if there were one; and in the alternative, that
there was no agreement upon which to base the charges for
carriage.
POINT 3
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT RESPONDENT WAS BOUND BY THE RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT
ON THE $3,400 CHECK PAID BY APPELLANT ON JULY 31, 1987
According to the court's Findings of Fact (R, 183-184),
the court stated the following:
At some later date a dispute developed over
the amount actually due to the plaintiff for
its services. In an effort to settle the
dispute, Larry Newman gave a $3,400 check to
an employee of the plaintiff with an attached
letter indicating that the said payment "will
satisfy all claims against Nova by
Consolidated Freights and C.F. will dismiss
all pending legal action
." The
plaintiff accepted and deposited the check in
its bank account.
According to the provisions of 70A-3-206(3), Utah Code
(Uniform Commercial Code),
. . . any transferee under an indorsement
which is conditional . . . must pay or apply
any value given by him for or on the security
of the instrument consistently with the
indorsement . . . .

22

A previous section, 70A-3-202(2), provides certain
requirements for an indorsement as follows:
An indorsement must be written by or on behalf
of the holder and on the instrument or on a
paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a
part thereof.
Since the court held that the conditions of negotiation
were met, it is Appellant's position that Respondent was bound by
the indorsement and that its acceptance and use of the funds
legally foreclose it from pursuing Appellant here.
No

doubt

Respondent's

argument

will

be that

the

provisions of 49 U.S. Code §10761 control here, as the court
found, and that the acceptance of the restrictively indorsed
check was a legally nullity as far as a dispute over the amount
owed was concerned.
Appellant concedes that this would be the probable
result _if the question had to do with a dispute over the tariff
charged.

However, as has been pointed out above, this is not the

case here.

Appellant asserts that the check written on July 31,

1987, along with its indorsement (Defendant's exhibits 2 and 1,
respectively), reflect a dispute not about the tariff rate, but
rather a dispute about the number of conveyances to be used and
the allocation of the appropriate tariff rate among the number of
vehicles.

Appellant believed then and continues to believe that

it had and has every right to question the number of vehicles
23

unilaterally utilized by Respondent as well as the application of
the tariff rate to the number of vehicles.

When Respondent

negotiated the check under the circumstances described herein, it
bound itself to an enforceable agreement relating to those
issues, thereby exculpating Appellant from any liability further
than the $3,400 paid.
POINT 4
THIS COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING
TO REFER THE QUESTION OF THE DISPUTE BEFORE IT
TO THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
Appellant's counsel moved the court at the time of
final

arguments

in this case to send this matter

Interstate Commerce Commission for a decision.

to the

Although the

transcript of the final arguments was not prepared, the court's
note at the end of its trial notes (R, 123) reflect that the
issue was before the court and considered by it. Furthermore the
issue was raised previously in response plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

(R, 90-95)

It is safe to say that the case holdings on the issue
before this court are sparse, and particularly those subsequent
to 1980, when the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 was adopted by
Congress.
In order that Appellant not be deprived of its rights
under the Constitution of the United States and under the laws of
24

this state, it is encumbent upon the court to submit the matter
before

it

to

the

Commission ("ICC.11)
the power,

jurisdiction

of

the

Interstate

Commerce

There is not question but that the ICC has

authority

and

jurisdiction

to deviate

from

the

apparent requirements of §10761 of the Interstate Commerce Act,
which the trial court in this case apparently feels it cannot do.
In a case entitled Injected Rubber Products Corporation v. Branch
Motor Express, Inc., numbered MC-C-30054, before the ICC on June
21, 1981, the ICC stated as follows at page 4 of its decision:
In our negotiated rates decision, we adopted a
policy statement holding that the filed rate
doctrine does not necessarily bar the shipper
from asserting equitable defenses against an
undercharge claim filed by a carrier.
We
considered and discussed jurisdictional
arguments against this policy in Wakefern Food
Corp. v. Southwest Frgt. Lines, Inc., !T~ICC2d
814 (l3"57j^ where we rejected assertion that
the charges contained in an applicable tariff
m u s t be assessed
regardless
of
the
circumstances.
We concluded that the
decisions in Negotiated Rates and Buckeye
Cellulose Corp. v. L & N RR. Co., 1 ICC2d 767
(1985), a?fTd sub. nom. "Seaboard System RR. v.
United States, 794 F.2d 635 (11th Cir., 1915677
conf irmed t hat our j u r i s d i c t i o n over
unreasonable practices under §10701(a) and
§10704 give us the authority to consider all
the circumstances surrounding an undercharge
suit.
As previously stated, our jurisdiction over
unreasonable practices gives us discretion to
find that the tariff rate filed by a motor
carrier need not and should not be applied in
a particular case. Therefore, our role in
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this proceeding is to undertake an advisory
analysis
of whether a negotiated but
unpublished rate existed, the circumstances
surrounding assessment of the tariff rate, and
any other pertinent facts, and to determine
(a) whether collection of undercharges based
on rate contained in the published tariff
would constitute an unreasonable practice, and
(b) if a negotiated rate is found to exist,
whether this amount is all that the carrier
should be permitted to collect.
Approximately one year later, on June 14, 1989, the ICC
issued another opinion clarifying its authority to determine
unreasonable practices.

Because of the length of the opinion,

the entire opinion is reproduced as Addendum A to this brief in
compliance with the provisions of Rule 24(f), Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals.

Generally, however, the decision acknowledges

that (1) the ICC has primary jurisdiction over
practice

issues;

(2)

that

the

unreasonable

unreasonable

practice

determinations of the ICC are binding dispositive of the issue of
the maximum reasonable compensation the carrier may receive for
the transportation involved; and that the determinations of the
ICC are subject to judicial review only to determine that they
are not arbitrary or capricious.
As relates

directly

1989 MCC LEXIS 333, Page 2
to this case, the

ICC

in the

opinion referred to herein stated at page 4, in reference to the
case of Seaboard System RR. Co., Inc. v. United States, 794 F.2d
635 (11th Cir., 1986) as follows:

26

We determined that a rail carrier's collection
of undercharges would be an unreasonable
practice, prohibited by §10701, where the
carrier's tariff was unclear to the ordinary
user and the shipper had relied on the
carrier's misquotation of the applicable rate
in determining to use the carrier for the
involved transportation.
'Appell ant believes that pursu • '

• •;

•, Section

7 of the Constitution of Utah, the decision of the Circuit Court
in this case cannot withstand

scrutiny.

On the one hand,

Respondent argues that a federal statute, i.e. 49 U.S.C. §10 761,
preempts the laws of the state of Utah

On the other hand, an

agency of the federal government, the ICC, by its own fiat can
relieve a person from its obligation to pay a certain tariff
rate.

Appellant believes that if the right is available on a

federal level (through the ICC), then the right to assert the
same defense on a
deprivation o^ that

should i lot be foreclosed, and tl le
4-

constitutes a denial of due process

and/or of equal protection to Appellant.
It is fundamental under our system that a litigaiit have
the oppoi: ti 11 iJ t;y t: : ". , , have [his] day in court on the merits
of a controversy.
Com1 11»

ia-

If the
dispute cm

Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control

\2d 1293, 1296 (1982) and cases cited inerein.
f

ie power to allow Appellant to have his

merits, and fails to exercise that power, thereby
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foreclosing Appellant from such opportunity, it is a violation of
Appellant's rights to due process of law.
Furthermore,
the

ICC

board

Appellant

asserts that if his access

is foreclosed by this court,

and

thereof his claim is not heard on the merits,
equal

protection

of

laws has likewise

result

that his right

been

violated.

Equal

situated.

Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, Utah 747 P.2d
Here,

persons

to

presupposes

887 (1988)

for

a

protection

884,

like treatment

as

to

similiarly

Appellant is being denied access to

ICC board while others presumably have access to it,

the

without any

justification for the denial.

VII
CONCLUSION
Appellant
contract
against
The

believes

that

there

was

between the parties from the outset,

no

enforceable

and that judgment

Appellant below was inappropriate on that reason

confusion relative to the number of trailers to be

convey

the

cargo

was

a point of

existence of the contract,
that point,

vital

alone.
used

to

to

the

significance

and in the absence of an agreement on

the contract is void because of a lack of a

of the minds.11
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,r

meeting

Appellant also believes that Respondent, as a matter of
law,

failed

at the time of trial to prove what the tariff

rate

actually was in the first instance, and in the second instance to
prove

its

Because
of

applicability

trailers,

and

the

applicability

of

the

parties.

the contract was rendered void.

tariff

the court are inapplicable to the

by

number

to

those

Furthermore, in this

Appellant urges this court to find that

cited

the

of the confusion surrounding the question of the

trailers

regard

to the contract between

the

authorities

facts of this

since there was no negotiation of the rates,

case,

which is proscribed

by the federal statute.
Appellantfs
bound

by

a

Respondent

restrictive
on

July

circumstances
check

had

third

to

do

indorsement on a

31,

resulting
with

contention is

1987.

that

Respondent

is

check

delivered

to

Appellant

believes

that

the

of

the

not

the

in the issuance and acceptance
the number

of

trailers

and

applicable tariff.
Appellant's
jurisdiction
lies

with

courtTs

to
the

last

contention

Furthermore,

that

determine questions of this kind in
Interstate Commerce

Commission,

failiiit* ! \ rrlei I he mattei i

Commission

is

results,
since

in

and

of itself,

and

primary
any

event

that

I he

Interstate

Commerce

in

reversible

error.

the ICC has the apparent power to relieve
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the

a

shipper

from

the payment

of undercharges

under

certain

conditions, and the trial court apparently believed that it did
not have that power, that to fail to refer this matter to the ICC
for determination constitutes a taking of Appellant's property,
i.e. its money, without due process of law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February,

1990.

P£TER W. GUYON
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, first-class
postage prepaid to the following on this

lb—

day of February,

1990.
Leslie Van Frank, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008
DATED this

/6ft day

of Februai
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ADDENDUM A

2

1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *
ni This decision embraces MC-C- 30090, National Industrial
Transportation League-Petition for a Declaratory Order on
Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates,
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
1989 MCC LEXIS 333

5

June 14, 1989
SYLLABUS:
£*13
Commission's authority to determine unreasonable practices clarified.
Unreasonable practice issues arising in motor common carrier negotiated rates
cases will be entertained without court referral. Petition requesting a general
order declaring unreasonable the practice of negotiating but not publishing
rates held in abeyance.

5!
S3

PANEL:
DECISION
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *1
By the Commission, Chairman Gradison, Vice Chairman Simmons, Commissioners
Andre, Lamboley, and Phillips. Commissioners Andre and Phillips commented with
separate expressions. Chairman Gradison dissented in part with a separate
expression
OPINION:
The National Industrial Transportation League (NITL) has requested that we
issue a general declaratory order finding that it is an unreasonable practice,
and thus a violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, for a motor common carrier
to conduct business on the basis of a negotiated and agreed-to rate while
failing to publish the rate In an effective tariff on file at the Commission,
We instituted a declaratory order proceeding under 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) and
requested comments on the proposal.

mM
^p|

i

More than 40 comments were submitted. n2 The majority were from shippers and
shipper trade associations supporting the
C*23
proposal. Two motor
carriers, a water carrier, two practitioners, counsel for an unsecured
creditors' committee, a tariff publishing agent, an agent for bankrupt, estates,
and the Household Goods Carriers1 Bureau, Inc. oppose any Commission action in
this area. Two other parties, the Regular Common Carrier Conference and the
American Trucking Associations, Inc., suggest that we await congressional action
on the subject.

CI

1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *2
n2 National Motor Freight Traffic Association, Inc. filed a motion
acceptance of its comments one day late. Under 49 C.F.R. § 11105, we
accept these comments. Transport Audit Service, Inc. also late-filed
comments, but without a request for late acceptance. However, since
consideration of its views will not prejudice any party, we will also
comments into the record.

^_
§f]
^ '
Jwj
OC

for
will
its

r

accept its

After considering the NITL proposal in light of the comments received and our
growing experience in the area, we have decided instead to reopen NITL — Pet.
to Inst. Rule on Negotiated Motor Car., 3 l.C.C.2d 99 (1986) (Negotiated Rates)
to clarify: that we have primary jurisdiction over unreasonable practice issues;
that aur unreasonable practice determinations are thus [*33
binding and
dispositive of the issue of the maximum reasonable compensation the carrier may
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now'entertain unreasonable practice claims based on negotiated rates without
awaiting a court referral. We believe it is preferable at this point to
continue to handle negotiated rates claims on a case-by-case basis, (We have
directed our staff to develop a flexible docket management plan for these cases
which will include participation by our Office of Hearings to ensure their
expeditious handling.) We will hold the petition in MC-C 1 30090 in abeyance
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for further consideration based on experience gained after implementation of
these measures.

1*

BACKGROUND
A motor common carrier is required, by 49 U.S-C. § 10761(a), to file tariffs
setting forth its charges for all transportation services offered and to collect
only the rates published in such filed tariffs. n3 However, the statute also
contains a requirement, in 49 U.S.C. S 10701, that a carrier's practices C*4J
be reasonable. n4
n3 Section 10761(a) states that a "carrier may not charge or receive a
different compensation for that transportation or service than the rate
specified in the tariff * * *"
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n4 Section 10701(a) states, "A rate (other than a rail rate), classification,
rule, or practice related to transportation or service * * * must be
reasonable."
In the past, the filed rate requirement of § 10761(a) was applied strictly.
Indeed ignorance or misquotation of a carrier's rates generally was not accepted
as an excuse for a shipper to pay other than the tariff rate., See, e.g., A.6.
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *4
Poor Grain Co. v. C.B. & Q. Ry. Co., 12 I.C.C. 418, 422-423 (1907); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915)(Maxwell). During an era of
substantial entry, rate regulation, and contracting limitations strict adherence
to the tariff rate was seen as necessary to avoid intentional misquotation of
rates by carriers seeking to discriminate in favor of particular shippers. See
Western Transp. Co. v. Wilson and Company, Inc., 682 F.2d 1227, 1230 (7th Cir.
1982).
In the mare competitive, more flexible pricing atmosphere created by 1980
deregulatory legislation, however, there is C*53
little likelihood of
carriers using a rate misquotation as a means to discriminate in favor of
particular shippers. Thus, in Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. L&N R.R. Co., 1
I.C.C.2d 767 (1985) (Buckeye), Aff'd sub nom. Seaboard System R.R. Co., Inc. v.
United States, 794 F.2d 635 (11th Cir. 1986) (Seaboard), we determined that a
rail carrier's collection of undercharges would be an unreasonable practice,
prohibited by § 10701, where the carrier's tariff was unclear to the ordinary
user and the shipper had relied on the carrier's misquotation of the applicable
rate in determining to use the carrier for the involved transportation.
In Negotiated Rates, supra, we extended the unreasonable practice analysis to
certain, narrowly defined circumstances in the motor carrier industry. We had
observed a disturbing pattern that, in the highly competitive environment
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *5
created by the Motor Carrier Act of 198QT certain carH pr *f h ^ H faiTprf tn £iia^
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encouraging pricing innovation and competition, and would not be necessary to
prevent discrimination.
We recognized that, under 49 U.S.C. §§ 11705(b)(3) and 11706(c)(2),
undercharge claims are brought in Federal District Courts, not before the
Commission. Therefore, we lack the authority ourselves directly to waive motor
carrier undercharges. Accordingly, we offered, upon court referral, to give our
"advisory opinion" as to whether in a particular case collection of undercharges
would constitute an unreasonable practice.
Since then, numerous courts have referred individual claims to us for an
unreasonable practice determination under our Negotiated Rates policy statement.
n5 However, as NITL points out, some courts have denied shipper motions for
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *6
referral of an unreasonable practice claim. n6 NITL believes that these denials
of referral t>7] requests are prompted by our own characterization of our
decisions as "advisory." Courts viewing our unreasonable practice finding as
merely a non-binding recommendation may believe they are bound by the statute
and by stare decisis to enforce collection of the filed rate.
n5 The Commission has issued decisions on the merits based upon its
Negotiated Rates policy in over 50 cases. Numerous other cases referred by the
courts have been decided an other grounds, such as tariff applicability.
n6 See, e.g., Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. Robert Yaquinto, Jr., 869 f.2d
1487 (Sth'cir. 1989)-, Motor Carrier Audit & Collection Co. v. United food
Service, Inc., (Case No. 87-C-29998, (D. Col. May 4, 1987), and West Coast Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co. (No. C-87-0048 MHP), (N.D. Cal.
July 28, 1987).
NITL argues that our issuance of its proposed declaratory order would
terminate the controversy among the courts by establishing that: (1) our
jurisdiction over reasonableness issues is plenary and exclusive; and (2) our
findings of unreasonableness are binding upon the courts (unless timely appealed
and overturned on court review). NITL also^argues that a general [*8]
finding would reduce litigation burdens by allowing courts to apply that
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *8
finding to the facts of particular cases without going through the referral
process.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A.

Commission Jurisdiction.

We now see that our "advisory opinion" language may have been a source of
confusion and requires clarification. n7 It was used only to illustrate that
this agency's unreasonable practice finding in certain instances may not be
self-enforcing (since courts, not the Commission, have the more narrower
authority to order or deny payment of undercharges in a particular case), and
would be issued only in response to a court referral of the unreasonable
practice issue.
n7 An additional notice and comment period is not necessary merely to clarify
our prior decision in Negotiated Rates, supra. However, since NITL raised the
"advisory opinion" issue in MC-C- 30090, all interested parties have had, in
fact, an additional opportunity to comment on this matter.
In fact, it is well-established that a transportation regulatory agency such
as ours has primary jurisdiction to determine whether a carrier practice is

reasonable. Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elev. Co., 259 U.S. [*9]
285,
291 (1922)("Whenever a * * * practice is attacked as unreasonable * *.*, there
must be preliminary resort to the Commission"); United States v. Western Pac. R.
Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 304
(1976)(Nader). The Commission has possessed this authority, to declare motor
carrier practices unreasonable, since 1935. n8 The many courts that have
recently referred negotiated rates claims to us have recognized this agency's
proper role in these matters. n9
n8 As originally enacted, Section 216(b) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935
provided:
It shall be the duty of every common carrier of property by motor vehicle * *
* to establish, observe, and enforce * * * 311st and reasonable regulations and
practices relating Cto transporation of property in interstate or foreign
commerce] * * *.

0)

49 Stat. 558 (1935).
n9 See, e.g., Orr Y . Sewell Plastics, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Tenn.
1988), appeal pending, Nos. 89-51089 and 89-5110 (6th Cir.HOrr); Maislin
Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo.
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1988), appeal pending, No. 88-2267-WM (8th Cir.)(Maislin).
Some courts, however, in declining to refer claims O 1 0 3
to us, have
suggested that our unreasonable practice findings are no more than responses to
ordinary contract questions and thus do not require an expert agency's
consideration. This is an inappropriately narrow view of our role. Our
Negotiated Rates policy stems from our expert analysis of current regulatory and
competitive conditions in the nation's motor carrier industry. While the
factual determinations in each case do have contract elements, the facts are
evaluated and ultimate conclusions reached in the context of what practices are
reasonable under current conditions in the industry. This is precisely the kind
of determination to be made by an expert agency. Nader, supra, 426 U.S. at 304.
n1Q
n10 This is not to say that at some future date we could not issue a rule
that the courts could apply themselves to individual cases. This has happened
in the past when, for example, courts have applied Commission-established
principles in misrouting cases. SeeJohnson Machine Works, Inc. v. Chicago,
Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co., 297 F.2d 793, 796-799 (8th Cir. 1962). .
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More fundamentally, these determinations involve a harmonization of two
different provisions of the same [*11]
statute. Section 10761 is only part
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *11
of an overall regulatory scheme; it should not be elevated over the unreasonable
practices provision of S 10701. Rather, there must be a balance drawn among the
sometimes competing congressional goals of fairness, competition,
nondiscrimination, and uniformity. The prime authority to harmonize and give
effect to these policies in a reasonableness determination is the Commission, as
the agency charged with administering the statute overall. Seaboard, supra, 794
F.2d at 638, citing Nader, supra, 426 U.S. at 304; Hudson Transit Lines, Inc. v.
ICC, 765 F.2d 329, 336 (2nd Cir. 1985).
B. Interplay Between Filed Rate Requirement and Reasonable Practice
Requirement.
Some courts have concluded that they are barred from giving effect to our
unreasonable practice findings in a negotiated rates case by Qudicial precedent
*-••---»- *-»
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iiuu ucuiiiune wnKLntr a carrier's solicitation, publication and billing
practices are unreasonable. Orr, supra, 705 F. Supp. at 679, Maxwell, supra
"dealt with the courts'
C*12 3
authority to grant equitable defenses to
undercharge actions." Seaboard, supra, 794 F.2d at 638 (emphasis in original).
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Our unreasonable practice findings are legal, rather than purely equitable
determinations and derive from our obligation under S 10701 to ensure that
practices in the nation's motor carrier industry are reasonable. n11 An
unreasonable practice determination is separate and apart from the filed rate
doctrine embodied in § 10761(a); it is a determination of a violation of
another, co-equal provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, prohibiting carriers
fi^om engaging in unreasonable practices. If rates and practices are not
reasonable, the filed rate requirement does not apply, as the Supreme Court
specifically recognized in Maxwell, supra, 237 U.S. at 97: Under the Interstate
Commerce Act, the rate of the carrier duly filed is the only lawful charge.
Deviation from it is not permitted upon any pretext. Shippers and travellers
are charged with notice of it, and they as well as the carrier must abide by it,
unless it is found by the Commission to be unreasonable. (Emphasis addedN.)
n11 We recognize that Negotiated Rates, supra, and some of our subsequent
decisions spoke in terms of "equitable defenses" to claims for undercharges.
While our unreasonable practice rulings are "equitable" in the sense that they
are intended to result in decisions that are fair to the parties, they are based
upon the legal requirements of § 10701 and may be more appropriately viewed as
the basis for a counterclaim or as mooting the original action for undercharges.
See Orr, supra.
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Rather than creating an exception or defense to the filed rate doctrine, what
the Commission is finding to be an unreasonable practice is a course of conduct
consisting of: (1) negotiating a rate; (2) agreeing to a rate that the shipper
reasonably relies upon as being lawfully fi£ed; (3) failing, either willfully or
otherwise, to publish the rate; (4) billing and accepting payment at the
negotiated rate for (sometimes) numerous shipments; and (5) then demanding
additional payment at higher rates. C*133
The Court amplified this in Arizona Grocery v. A.T.S.F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S.
370, 384 (1932), where it distinguished between legal rates, "that is, those
which must be charged to all shippers alike", and lawful rates, which are those
that are reasonable. Legal rates are lawful only if they are reasonable; "* * *
the shipper was bound to pay the legal rate; but if he could show that it was
unreasonable he might recover reparation." Id. Similarly, a court refusal to
enforce the (legal) tariff rate when the collection of that rate is unlawful
(i.e., when the Commission has determined that the collection of the tariff rate
constitutes an unreasonable practice) accords with established law. n12 In these
circumstances, rather than abrogating the filed rate doctrine (as some carrier
interests have argued), this construction of the Act appropriately reconciles §§
10701 and 10761. n13
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n12 Maxwell and Arizona Grocery involved the reasonableness of the rate
levels rather than the reasonableness of the practices. However, the same
statutory language applies to both. See 49 u.S.C. S 10701(a)
n13 See Orr, supra, 703 F. Supp. at 679:

still as valid as ever. But where the doctrine is applied in a wooden, rigid
manner that is contrary to congressional policy with respect to the interstate
trucking industry, the ICC has decided that it will consider all the
circumstances before determining whether an undercharge assessment is consistent
with the spirit of the statute. Nor does this policy undercut the mandate of 49
U.S.C. § 10761(a) that a "carrier may not charge or receive a different
compensation for that transportation or service than the rate specified in the
tariff* * * * This blanket prohibition is tempered by the ICC's jurisdiction to
declare some practices to be "unreasonable" under 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a).

0>

Accord Carolina Motor Express, Inc. v. Delaware Valley Shippers Ass'n, No.
SE-C-87-147, slip opinion at 7-8 (W.D. N.C. April 20, 1989) ("To hold the filed
rate doctrine to be infallible under all circumstances would, in effect, allow
common carriers to have their cake and eat it too * * * a finding of the ICC
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *13
that a collection of undercharges would be an unreasonable practice is not
contrary to law in appropriate cases."); Maislin, supra, 705 F. Supp. at 1406 ("
* * * we emphasize that the ICC is not abolishing the requirement in S 10761 * *
* " ) . £*143
The fact that the Commission may not have exercised its unreasonable practice
authority in the negotiated rates area in this manner until recently does not
mean that the agency lacks such authority or cannot use it in this manner. See
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 682, 693-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert, denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 647-48 (1950) (neither failure of the FTC since its creation to
exercise certain power nor intermittent statements that it lacked such power
deprived agency from exercising a power granted by Congress). The present
exercise of this authority responds to current marketplace developments and
problems and is warranted and justified on the evidentiary record of the cases
presented to the Commission.
The court referral procedure is not new, nor is it unlawful (as some carrier
interests have suggested) because it permits the courts and the Commission
acting together to allow defenses the court could not entertain alone. It has
long been recognized that the statute implrcitly permits a judicial remedy (with
initial referral to the Commission) for unreasonable practices. See

u

5!
0)
®

1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *14
Hewitt-Robins

C*153

v. Freight-ways, 371 U.S. 84 (1962).

That implicit authority was later made explicit by Congress, and discussed in
the rate reasonableness context in Informal Procedure for Determining
Reparation, 335 I.C.C. 403 (1969). Briefly, prior to 1959, the Act conferred no
explicit authority upon the Commission to award reparations in cases involving
motor carrier rates or practices. The Commission, however, tooK the view that
it had implicit authority to pass on the lawfulness of motor carrier rates, but
(since it lacked authority to award reparations) refrained from exercising that
authority except upon a court referral. In 1959, the Supreme Court ruled that
neither the courts nor the Commission could consider, in post-shipment
litigation, the reasonableness of a motor carriers rates. n14 As a result, in
1965 Congress passed the provisions that are now codified at 49 U.S.C. SS
11705(b)(3) and 11706(c)(2). n15
n14 T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959). For unreasonable
practices, Hewitt-Robins found that an implicit judicial remedy was consistent
with the statutory scheme, and that T.I.M.E. therefore did not apply to practice
cases. Hewitt-Robins, 371 U.S. at 89.
n15 Prior

section 204a for motor carriers.

C*163
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Section 11705(b)(3) imposes liability for damages resulting from violations
of the Act upon motor common carriers, n16 Section 11706(c)(2) permits recovery
of damages under § 11705(b)(3) in a "civil action11 instituted within two years
after the claim accrues. n17 What Congress intended was to restore the procedure
that existed prior to T.I.M.E., supra (see n. 13): that shippers1 recourse for
reparations must be to the courts, but before a court may award reparations, it
must refer to the Commission any counterclaim that the rates (or, as here,
practices) have not been reasonable. Informal Procedure, 335 I.C.C. at 413.
Accord United States v. Associated Transport, Inc. 505 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
n16 Section 11705(b)(3) states: "A common carrier providing transportation or
service subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter II [motor
carriers] * * * is liable for damages resulting from the imposition of rates for
transportation or service the Commission finds to be in violation of this
subtitle."
n17 This is in contrast to S§ 11705(b)(2) and 11706(c)(1), which impose
l i a b i l i t y f o r damages on r a i l (subchapter I) and water (subchapter I I I ) c a r r i e r s
and expressly authorize persons to " f i l e a complaint w i t h the Commission" to
recover damages.
damaoes. [*173
[*17]
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *17
The referral of negotiated rates cases to the Commission for determination of
the unreasonable practice issue, followed by enforcement of the Commission's
findings by the court, thus follows a long-standing procedure « codified in
1965 but based upon authority that was implicit before that. Contentions by
carrier interests that Commission findings may be ignored because the Commission
cannot enforce them, or that court adoptions of them are somehow unlawful
because courts may not themselves grant "equitable defenses" to undercharge
actions, are thus without merit. n18
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n18 We emphasize again that our findings vis-a-vis the statutory provisions
concerning unreasonable practices under S 10701 are not "equitable defenses" but
enforcement of affirmative statutory requirements and obligations.
C.

Policy Considerations.

As we have explained, our Negotiated Rates policy does not represent a
relaxed interpretation of S 10751, but rather a separate determination under §
10701. But even if it were viewed as a reinterpretation of a previously strict
construction of S 10761, it would be one that is well within this agency's
authority (and indeed duty) to reinterpret the Interstate
C*18] Commerce
Act, based upon experience gained and changing circumstances. As explained by
the Supreme Court:
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *18
CTlhe Commission, faced with new developments or in light of reconsideration
of the
the relevant facts and its mandate, may alter its past interpretation and
and
overturn past administrative rulings and practices * * *. Regulatory agencies
do not establish rules of conduct to last forever, they are supposed, within the
limits of the law and of fair and prudent administration, to adapt their rules
and practices to the nation's needs in a volatile changing economy. They are
neither required nor supposed to regulate the present and the future within the
inflexible limits of yesterday.
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 387 U.S.
397, 416 (1967) (ATA).
Our Negotiated Rates policy is fully consistent with the policy goals of the
Interstate Commerce Act. Carriers are still required to file their rates in
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abuses, where the shipper's reliance on the
rate quoted was reasonable under the circumstances, should not lead to any
widespread disregard for the tariff filing requirement. In fact, there has been
nothing in the records of the cases we have reviewed to suggest that it was the
intent of the parties to establish secret, discriminatory rates. Rather, the
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *19
carriers simply negotiated these rates to attract business, not with any intent
to prefer one of their shippers to the disadvantage of others. Indeed, the
effort was to promote and sell the carrier's service generally, not to attact a
particular customer. The shipper made its determination to use the carrier's
service based on the quoted rate. To permit the carrier subsequently to collect
a substantially different higher rate for the past transportation service
because if failed to publish the rate would be antithetical to a fundamental
purpose of publishing rates — i.e., to permit shippers to choose the best rate
for their shipments from among those offered by competing carriers.
Nor do we anticipate this policy, which is limited to narrow :ircumstances,
to lead to unreasonable discrimination. Shippers m today's marketplace
[*203 are protected from unreasonable discrimination by vigorous competition.
As a result of changes in the law and our interpretation of it, the range of
activities considered discriminatory is much narrower than it formerly was.
One of the most significant changes m the motor carrier industry has been
the substantial loosening of entry controls. In 1979 (immediately prior to the
Motor Carrier Act of 19B0), there were approximately 17,000 regulated motor
common carriers. n19 Because of relaxed entry requirements, there are now more
than 39,000 motor carriers of property operating in the United States. n20
Moreover, prior to 1980, carriers' operating authority was often narrowly
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circumscribed, both with respect to the territory to be served and the
commodities to be carried. Today, carriers can obtain readily a license to
transport virtually all types of commodities throughout the contiguous 48
states. n21 Thus, today, shippers do not depend upon regulation to protect them
from discriminatory pricing; in most circumstances, there are simply more
competitive options. Cf. Cent. & Southern Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v. U.S.,
757 F.2d 301, 325-326 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
n19 H.Rep. No. 96-1069, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
Cong. & Ad. News, 2283, 2284.

!
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Code

n2Q Forthcoming Interstate Commerce Commission 1988 Annual Report Appendix E,
Table 1.
n21 See Acceptable Forms of Requests for Operating Authority, 133 M.C.C.
(1984), and cases cited therein. C*213

329

In addition, given the statutory policy of encouraging a variety of price and
service options, activities are now permitted that previously would have been
considered discriminatory. Negotiated Rates, 3 I.C.C.Zd at 106. Volume
discount rates, for example, are not per se discriminatory. Lawfulness of Vol.
Discount Rates-Mot. Com. Car., 365 I.C.C. 711 (1982). They may, for example,
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *21
be justified by cost savings achieved by the carrier. Id. at M 5 . There are
other means of lawfully and reasonably assessing different rates for different
shippers. For example, rates specified for a particular shipper are no lonqer
per se discriminatory. Rates for a Named Shipper or Receiver, 367 I.C.C. 959
(1984). Carriers may limit the shippers to whom rates apply by establishing
.*r,H,,^ort r^toc hw i tpw nuitthpr^ listed in the National Motor Freight
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Most significantly, a carrier may now hold both common and contract operating
authority. n22 For operations conducted under contract authority, carriers do
not have to file their rates, n23 nor are they subject to the antidiscrimination
[*223
provisions of the Act. n24 The 1980 Act also greatly broadened the scope
of contract service by, inter alia, removing limits on the number of shippers a
contract carrier could serve n25 and by removing restrictions on the nature of
shippers, commodities shipped, and permissible geographic scope of contract
carrier permits. n26 Therefore, motor common carriers that desire for some
reason to discriminate among shippers in their rates (for example, to offer
lower rates to large shippers) may do so lawfully simply by obtaining contract
carrier authority.

1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *22
n22 Deletion of 49 C.F.R. § 10Q4.3 Dual Operations Policy (not printed),
served July 2, 1980; Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-296, section
10(b), 94 Stat. 793, 800 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10930(a)).
n23 Exemption-MTR. Contr. Car.-Tariff Filing Requirements, 133 M.C.C. 150
(1983), aff'd sub nom. Central & Southern Motor Freight Association v. United
States, 757 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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n24 Cent. & Southern Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n, supra at n, 152, citing 49
U.S.C. §§ 10704(c) and 10741(b).
n25 Id., section 10(a)(1), 94 Stat, at 799-800.
n26 Id. at section 10(a)(3), 94 Stat, at 800 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §
10923(d)(1)). C*233
Hundreds, or even thousands, of individual motor common carrier rates are now
negotiated daily. Moreover, reduced tariff rates may now be filed to become
effective on one day's notice. n27 In these circumstances, it would be extremely
difficult for shippers to determine, prior to an initial movement, whether the
agreed-upon rate is actually on file (or what rates their competitors are
paying). Moreover, as we have said before, "an inflexible policy [would]

5i
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frustrate the intent of the [national transportation policy] to encourage price
innovation, since it could chill rate negotiation between shippers and carriers,
and inhibit legitimate pricing initiatives." Negotiated Rates, supra, at 106.
n28 Preventing unreasonable discrimination is only one of several important
goals set forth by Congress, and should not necessarily be elevated above all
other concerns. n29
n27 Short Notice Effectiveness for Independently Filed Rates, 1 I.C.C.2d 146
(1984), aff'd sub nom. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. U.S., 773
F.2d 1561 (1985).
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n28 Accord In re: Carolina Motor Express, Inc., supra, slip op. at 8; Orr,
supra, 703 F. Supp at 680.
n29 Some courts have cited Square D. v. Niagara Frontier Traffic Bureau, 476
U.S. 409 (1986) for the proposition that, because Congress has not abolished the
tariff filing requirement, the Commission (and the courts) cannot disturb the
filed rate doctrine. Square D is inapposite because it dealt with the courts'
authority to depart from long-standing court created precedent, which was deemed
to have worked well and was believed to have been adopted by Congress, not an
agency's right to interpret (see Morton Salt, supra) or reinterpret (see ATA,
supra) its own statute. This agency possessed the statutory authority to set
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three specific references to the Commission's power to set aside rates contained
in published tariffs. Square D, supra, at 416; 416, n. 18; and 418, n. 22.
Moreover, court adherence to court-created precedent of long standing is not
inviolable. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 57 U.S.L.U.,
4539, 4541, Justice Stevens' dissent. Thus we are not pursuaded that the policy
announced in Negqtlated Rates, supra, would be foreclosed even if it had be^n
based on no more than our reinterpretation of S 10761.
However, as discussed supra, while the pro-competitive policy in the 1980
legislation and the resulting sweeping changes in the motor carrier industry
provided the changed circumstances that were sufficient to justify reexamination
of the file rate doctrine, they were not the source of our authority to make the
limited exception thereto embodied in the Negotiated Rates policy. That
authority came from S 10701 itself and our judicially recognized authority to
determine what constitutes an unreasonable rate practice in the transportation
industries we regulate. C*24]
In sum, we are persuaded that the carrier practice of negotiating a rate,
failing to publish that rate, and then later (often many months or years and
numerous shipments later) billing at a higher rate is unreasonable in today's
environment in the motor carrier industry. We are also satisfied that this
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *24
conclusion is fully consistent with the language and goals of the Interstate
Commerce Act, and indeed is necessary because of the many changed circumstances
in regulation and competition that have occured in the motor carrier industry.
D.

Court Referral.
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As a matter of administrative procedure we previously stated that we would
exercise our discretionary declatory order authority to resolve unreasonable
practice claims based on negotiated rates only upon a court referral of the
case. n30 We explained that the typical case affects only the immediate parties
involved and has no overriding policy issues beyond those already addressed in
our Negotiated Rates, supra, decision. n31 In addition, these cases were likely
to go to court eventually, and there would bg little or no savings in legal
costs in coming to the Commission first. n32
n30 Negotiated Rates, supra, served August 25, 1987. We also believed that
following a number of decisions on referral: (1) the courts would implement our
negotiated rates policy through application of our precedent; and/or (2)
carriers or their agents would no longer seek to recover undercharges in the
face or our consistent findings.
®
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n31 We had previously announced a policy as to tariff applicability
questions, which were numerous and complex, that because of limited agency
resources, we would resolve only those disputes that are referred by a court or
involve broad issues of industry-wide application. Docket No. 37476, Intercity
Transportation Company Petition for Declaratory Order - Classification of
Battery Pack Cabinets (not printed), served August 30, 1983, aff'd., Intercity
Transportation Company, et ai. v. United States, 737 F.2d 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
n32 The decision also noted that we waive our usual filing fee for cases
referred to us by a court. Ue have recently stated our belief that "it is
appropriate to take a consistent approach with respect to the assessment of fees
for * * * [negotiated rates] cases, whether or not they are referred
to us by a
court." Ex Parte No. 246 (Sub-No. 7 ) , Regulations Governing Fees for Services
Performed in Connection with Licensing and Related Services - 1989 Update (not
printed), served June 9, 1989, at 5. Accordingly, we have held that "For the

0)

icei in uiesc v,a^ei> in d buubt:qut:ni ubtr ree update proceeding." id.

C*25]

In light of our experience since then, we now have decided to accept
petitions for a declaratory order based on negotiated rates claims without a
prior court referral. n33 As with the "advisory opinion" language, it is
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possible that our prior reluctance to hear these cases may have .suggested to
courts an ambivalence on our part as to our proper role in this area. Our
decision to entertain these petitions without a court referral reflects and
underscores our primary jurisdiction over the unreasonable practice issues that
arise in these cases.
n33 We may announce our intention to entertain such declaratory order
petitions without seeking public comment on the specific question. Whether or
not to issue a declaratory order is a discretionary matter, and we have in the
past, without prior notice and comment, made general pronouncements about our
willingness (or unwillingness) to entertain particular Kinds of declaratory
order petitions. See Battery Pack Cabinets, supra. In any event, the general
question of declaratory order requirements was presented again in the NIT1
petition in No. MC-C- 3Q090.
Thus, advance notice (even though not required)
has been provided.
Moreover,
f>263
while each individual case affects primarily the parties
to that case, each case is also part of what now is clearly a growing pattern
and nationwide problem of large scope, and, cumulatively, may affect litigation
in other cases. As mentioned above, we have already resolved over 50 negotiated
rates cases and there have been numerous others that district courts have
declined to refer to us. Millions of dollars are involved in these cases.
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The Congressionally mandated goals of encouraging competition, innovative
pricing, nondiscrimination, and reasonable practices are also at stake. To the
extent that entertaining declaratory order petitions without awaiting court
referral will increase uniformity in court decisions and help in resolving this
national problem, we must commit ourselves tQ doing everything within our
jurisdiction to solve the problem.
We clearly have the authority to accept such petitions whether or not a court
suit had been filed. Under section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
we have broad discretion to "issue a declaratory order to terminate a
controversy or remove uncertainty." A controversy or uncertainty can exist even
if no court proceedings are C*273
pending at the time of the administrative
proceeding. See State of Texas Y . United States, 866 F.2d 1546 (5th Cir. 1989).
Once a carrier has billed for undercharges that the shipper believes are
unreasonable, an uncertainty or controversy can exist.
E.

Co

NITL's General Finding Request

In light of our clarification and modification of our negotiated rates policy
and procedures here, we believe that it is preferable to implement these matters
first. If experience shows that NITL's petition for a general declaratory order
remains necessary or useful, we can act at that time.

CO
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NITL's primary reason for the declaratory order ~ to answer the confusion
stemming from our "advisory opinion" language — has been met by our
clarification here of our primary jurisdiction over questions of the
reasonableness of practices. Commission consideration of these cases will
permit a uniform (and appropriately limited) application of our negotiated rates
policy. At some future date, based upon our experience with these cases, we may
develOD General
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• This decision will not significantly affect either the quality of the human
environment or the conservation of energy resources. It is issued pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 553, and 49 U.S.C. §§ 10321 and 10701(a). It is ordered:
1. The late-filed comments of the National Motor Freight Traffic
Association, Inc. and of Transport Audit Service, Inc. are accepted.
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2. Ex Parte No. MC-177 is reopened and consolidated with Ex Parte No.
MC-C- 30090.
3. Our prior findings in Ex Parte No. MC-177 are clarified and modified to
the extent discussed above.
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4. The petition for declaratory order filed by the National Industrial
Transportation League will be held in abeyance.
5. Notice of this decision will be published in the Federal Register and the
ICC Register on June 30, 1989.
6-

0)

This decision is effective on June 29, 1989.

DISSENTBY: ANDRE; PHILLIPS; GRADISON (In Part)
DISSENT:
COMMISSIONER ANDRE, commenting:

I*

While I agree with the approach taken in this decision, I would have also
granted the petition in MC-C- 30Q9Q without holding that proceeding in
abeyance.
COMMISSIONER PHILLIPS, commenting:
The "negotiated rates" or "undercharge" issue has brought substantial
uncertainty and turmoil to the shipping t*29] community in recent years.
Under current law, carriers are obligated to file tariffs with the Commission
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showing each rate negotiated, and the "filed rate doctrine" prohibits variations
from these filed tariffs. Unfortunately, for any number of reasons, carriers at
times do not file tariffs for rates that have been agreed upon by the shipper
and the carrier. While shippers should seeK to ensure that carriers do file
tariffs for rates which they have negotiated and upon which they have agreed,
the fact remains
that the shippers alone frequently are being held accountable
for carriers1 failures to file tariffs, often years after the transportation in
question occurred.
I am very pleased with the Commission's action in this decision, in which we
further clarify and enunciate our policy regarding negotiated rates cases. By
reopening Ex Parte No. MC-177, we are clarifying the following: (1) that our
opinions in negotiated rates cases represent the exercise of the Commission's
primary jurisdiction and thus are binding and only subject to judicial review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard; (2) that we will consider
negotiated rates cases without court referral; and (3) that O 3 0 ] we will
continue to handle these cases on a case-by-case basis
I believe the Commission's action here will strengthen the legal posture of
shippers who seek to rely on the Commission's MC-177 policy in obtaining relief
in negotiated rates cases. Further, I am hopeful that our clarified policy will
encourage swifter resolution of these cases. Lastly, I support our decision
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *30
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declaratory order stating in general terms the circumstances when the collection
of alleged undercharges would constitute an unreasonable practice would leave
the determination as to whether any particular set of facts amounts to an
unreasonable practice to the courts. Under current case law, it is not clear
that such an approach would be sufficiently persuasive to some courts to
increase the probability that a shipper making the types of showings required by
such a declaratory order would prevail. This is not to say, however, that the
declaratory order approach does not have merit. Rather, I believe that by
holding the petition in H O C - 3QQ90 in abeyance, in conjunction with our action
in Ex Parte No. MC-177, the Commission will
i>313
be able to assess the
progress made under the policies enunciated in this decision and to reconsider
adoption of the MC-C- 30090 petition should it appear to be the most
advantageous course of action in the future.
CHAIRMAN GRADISON, dissenting in part:
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The majority refuses to take the one final step which could be taken
administratively to help alleviate the negotiated rates difficulties which
continue to plague shippers. The majority fails to articulate why it will not
do the one thing which the petitioner has asked us to do: issue a declaratory
order finding that it is an unreasonable practice and thus a violation of the
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Interstate Commerce Act for a motor common carrier to conduct business on the
basis of a negotiated and agreed to rate while failing to publish that rate in a
tariff on file at this Commission. Surely the petitioner is in the best
position to know what administrative assistance would be most helpful to its
members in defending themselves against the unreasonable carrier practices
addressed in this proceeding. Under these circumstances, the majority's
decision falls short of providing the full measure of regulatory relief
available by its reluctance to provide [*323
all of the assistance requested.
Three years ago when the Commission first began its endeavors in Ex Parte No.
MC-177 we moved very cautiously along the then uncharted waters surrounding
motor common carrier negotiated rates problems. Today, after gaining several
years experience, there can be no doubt thajt the Commission can, and must, move
decisively to counteract the blatant abuse of a regulatory system by a small,
but persistent, group of motor common carriers. Out of overriding concern for
those shippers who must continue to defend themselves against these unreasonable
rates practices, I would go a full step further than the majority and grant the
NITL's request for a declaratory order.
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